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LIMITATIONS

UPON ACCUMULA-

TION OF INCOME IN PENNSYLVANIA FOR NON-CHARITABLE
PURPOSES
The problem of this paper is to inform other lawyers
with the benefit of an investigation of the Pennsylvania
authorities as to the limits to which they may safely advise a
client that directions to accumulate income of a trust, created
either by will or by deed, will be upheld. The paper first
discusses the Thellusson litigation in England and the effect
of the Thellusson Act upon the law there. A comparison
is then made of the English act with the Pennsylvania act
which was modelled from it. The law of accumulations in
Pennsylvania is almost entirely controlled by the Act of
April 18, 1853, P. L. 503, and the confusing line of decisions made under this act, although such accumulations,
which would have been void before the passage of the act
as a violation of the rule against perpetuities, are still invalid without reference to the act. The more important
of these Pennsylvania decisions are then discussed, and in
conclusion, the probable results of accumulation directed
by deed are considered.

Peter Thellusson made a will. Such it seems to me
must be the first sentence in any monograph upon statutes
against accumulations. The Act of 39 and 40 Geo. III, c.
98, was passed as a direct result of the Thellusson will, and
the statutes which have since been passed in other jurisdictions have been so influenced by this act that they can fairly
be said to have been copied.' A very general discussion of
the important events in the Thellusson estate will therefore
'For a study of such statutes see Runk, AMERICAN STATUTORY
MODIFICATIONS OF THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, OF TRUSTS FOR AcCUMULATIONS AND OF SPENDTHRIFT

Rev. 397 (1932).

TRUSTS, in 80 Univ. of Penna. Law

DICKINSON LAW REViEW

be not without interest and importance to readers of this
paper.
Peter Thellusson, a native of Geneva, became a successful London merchant. By his will, dated April 2, 1796,
he devised all of his residuary estate, valued at about 600,000 pounds, to three trustees named in the will. The duration of the trust was to be as follows: during the natural
lives of his three sons. and of the sons of his said sons. and
of such issue as any of his grandsons might have, as should
be living at the time of his decease or born in due time afterwards, and during the natural lives of the survivors or survivor of the said several persons. The trustees were to invest all income from the trust estate in the purchase of real
estate, throughout the duration of the trust. At the death
of the last survivor of the persons named the real estate
originally devised together with that accumulated was to be
divided into three parts, one part to be settled on "the eldest
male lineal descendant then living" of each of the testator's
three sons in tail male, etc. If there were a failure of male
descendants of one or more of the sons the whole property
was to be divided into two parts, or allowed to remain intact for one "eldest male lineal descendant then living."
These limitations were not followed by any limitations to
the heirs general of the testator, but if there was a general
failure of such heirs, then the property was to be converted
into money and given to the then King of England to be
applied to the use of the Sinking Fund, in such manner as
should be directed by Parliament.
The testator being at the time of writing the will aged
sixty-one, and having his three sons married and still having children, it might have been that at the death of the
testator the list of cestuis que vie would include great grandchildren, and might quite conceivably have numbered several dozen. Mr. Thellusson, however, died soon after the
will was written and left so far as his male line was concerned, three sons and six grandsons, two of the grandsons
having been born after the death of the testator, but having
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been born within six months of the death of the testator,
they were included as being born "within due time".
Mr. Morgan, the celebrated actuary of the Equitable
Life Assurance Company, calculated that the probability
was that one of these nine would survive for seventy years,
or until the year 1868. There was then also the possibility
of one or more of the beneficial takers being a minor, in
which case the accumulations would continue, while not
under the will, but as a matter of law, until the date of his
majority. It was thought that the reasonable minimum
probable continuance of the accumulation was eighty years.
Accumulating the estate left for this period at 5% (although
it was probable it could accumulate faster) in seventy-five
years it would amount to some 23,000,000 pounds.
The Thellusson will was the cause of an extended and
very expensive litigation. Lord Chancellor Loughborough
2
in 1801 delivered the opinion in Thellusson v. Woodford,
Gupholding the validity of the limitations and directing that
the trusts be performed. On appeal the case was affirmed
by the House of Lords in 1805. 3 In 1821 the case of
Oddie v. Woodford4 was brought to determine the meaning
of "male lineal descendants". In 1833, the expenses of
management, combined with the inefficiencies of disinterested trustees resulted in leasing the whole of the properties
held under the Thellusson trust to Lord Rendlesham, Thellusson's eldest male lineal descendant, at an adequate rent.,
This solution was consented to by all the cestuis que vie and
by his Majesty so far as his interests in the ultimate limitation were concerned. Under this Act the lessee managed
the property, and the annual rent was applied to the purposes mentioned in the will. An examination of the statement of the trustees6 will show something of the nature of
the accumulations until 1833.
z4 Ves. 343.
3Thellusson v. Woodford, 11 Ves. 112, 1 New Repr. 357.
'3 M. 8 C. 584.
53 & 4 Win. IV. c. 27, Private, 14 Aug. 1833.
6Jour. H. of L. vol. lxv. p. 490 (1833), reprinted in Hargraves, A
TREATISE ON THE THELLUSSON ACT, p. 13 et seq. (1842).
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Concerning the legal validity of the Thellusson limita7
tions, Hargraves says,
"it must be admitted, . . . that although the testator had* abused the right of alienation, and had
violated the spirit and intention of the law of executory devise, in the creation of a trust of the most unjust and inequitable character; in short, although Mr.
Thellusson's will well merited every epithet indignantly applied to it in the argument of learned and enthusiastic counsel for his family, and although injustice,
absurdity, eccentricity, ambition, avarice, and heartlessness had all combined in the creation of this testamentary trust, yet the law would not have been justified in annulling Mr. Thellusson's will, nor equity in
declining to execute his trust. Every. court before
which this cause was successively taken, concurred in
disclaiming any such power. It was no new thing for
Judges to have to lament their inability to overturn
such dispositions of property. Sometimes, indeed,
some fortunate technical error or omission in the
frames or words of such instruments enables the courti
to overturn entire dispositions, to declare testators
legally intestate, and to distribute their property according to the law of intestacy.
(p. 25) But in Mr. Thellusson's will, al,
though the purposes to which the accumulations were
to be applied were as selfish, inequitable, and eccentric
as can be easily conceived, no such technical error or
fatal ambiguity could be found."
The rule against perpetuities fixes the latest period at
which an estate may vest as a life or lives in being plus a
period of twenty-one years, whether or not in reference to
any minority, plus one or two periods of gestation, if , and
only if, they exist. The only limitation upon the lives in
being seems to be the one of practical necessity that the individuals so selected must be such that there is a probability
of being able to ascertain the date of the death of the survivor. Mr. Thellusson chose the lives of all of his male
descendants at the time of his death, hence all were lives in
being, and avoided using the further period of twenty-one
years, which was then less certainly a period which could
7Hargraves. Supra. note 6 pps. 21, 22.
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be in gross (not definitely decided until 1833).8 Thus it is
obvious that the estate in the beneficial takers could not by
any possibility be prevented from vesting for a longer
period of time than that allowed by the rule against perpetuities.
Mr. Hargraves probably voiced the feeling of the English people in the epithets with which he characterizes Mr.
Thellusson's purposes. It may be doubted whether Mr.
Thellusson was so very unusual in his ambitions. Few
people have attempted to accumulate the entire income of
such a large fortune. The idea of accumulation, however,
is a very old one, which many, if not all of us, have contemplated. Give me one grain of wheat today, two grains
tomorrow, four the next day, and so on for a month, and at
the end of that time I shall be a rich man. How often do
people calculate a similar thing with pennies! The idea of
setting aside a small sum, which amounts to very little at
present, and allowing it to accumulate at compound interest for a long time, presents a very interesting mathematical
phenomenon, which has excited the imaginations of many.
"The ingenious Dr. Franklin," whose philanthropy is above
reproach, adopted the idea of accumulations for charitable
purposes.9 By his will he left legacies to the cities of Boston
and of Philadelphia of 1,000 pounds each to be accumulated
by being loaned to young married artificers at interest
for 100 years. By this plan he calculated that each legacy
would be then worth 131,000 pounds, of which 100,000
pounds was to be spent on public improvements, while the
balance was to be accumulated for another century, at which
time it would amount to 4,061,000 pounds, which was then
to be expended on public improvements by the cities and
states respectively. Use of the same system has been considered by many for purposes of building up a family aristocracy based upon wealth. It thus seems that Mr. Thellusson should not be thought the selfish scoundrel which
Hargraves tries to make him.
sCadell v. Palmer, 1 Clark 6 F. 372.
OSee Hargraves. Supra.. note 6, p. 34.
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The position of the state on the other hand in desiring
to prevent, or at least control, accumulations is not only
sensible but necessary. The history of Mortmain goes to
the roots of English law. The growth of the rule against
perpetuities is a well known chapter. Exactly the same
broad principles and policy demand the limitation of accumulations. The Thellusson trust, having been drawn so
as to avoid the clutches of the law as it then existed, demanded some legislative action in order to prevent its too
frequent recurrence. Indeed, even before the decision of
the House of Lords in 1805 on the Thellusson will, instructions had been given for two wills to be drawn up with all
beneficial enjoyment of the testator's estate prevented until
"the death of the last survivor of all the members of the
peerage" living at the testator's decease. 1" To remedy the
Thellusson abuse of existing law, Parliament passed the
Act of 39 & 40 Geo. III, c. 98, 1800,11 known usually as The
Thellusson Act, which was substantially copied by Pennsylvania in the Act of April 18, 1853. P. L. 503.12
II

Were it not for the Thellusson Act, trusts for accumulation in England might exist for the full limit of executory
devises, that is, for lives in being plus twenty-one years.
Under the Statute, Hargraves states the limits of accumu3
lation as follows:'
"(1) real or personal property may be limited by
way of executory devise so that the vesting of the
beneficial ownership of the original corpus of the property so settled by a testator shall be in suspense until
twenty-one years after the decease of the last survivor
of all the testator's children; (2) until which period he
may also postpone the beneficial enjoyment of the aggregate rents, profits and produce, or of the estates
l0Ibid., p. 36.
11See Appendix A.
"See Appendix B. The amendment of this act by the Act of April

14, 1931 P. L. 29 does not concern the topic of this paper.

lsHargraves, Supra. note 6, p. 112.
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wherein thle trustees have invested such rents, profits
and produce, during an accumulation continuing for
twenty-one years from his own decease; (3) but with
respect to the intermediate period between the end of
the twenty-one years from his own decease, and the
end of twenty-one years from the decease of the last
survivor of his children, the rents, profits and produce
arising from the aggregate trust property during such
period (being item (1) plus (2) ) must be either limited so as to vest in beneficial ownership at the end of
the twenty-one years from the testator's own decease
or else be allowed to go as in cases of intestacy."
From this it will be seen that although the accumulations
which it was legally possible for Peter Thellusson to direct
have been greatly curtailed by the English Act, it is still
possible to direct accumulations for the term of twenty-one
years as a period in gross from the death of the testator,
and to capitalize these accumulations at that time, to be
restricted to the period of remoteness allowed by executory
devises. How much more restrictive than this is the law
of Pennsylvania, under an almost identical statute, will be
discussed in the remainder of this paper.
The law of Pennsylvania as to accumulations prior to
the passage of the Statute of Accumulations 1 4 is well summarized in the Report of the Commissioners on the Price

Act:15

"As the law now stands here, an estate may be
made to accumulate and double many times, so long as
any number of designated persons, living at the death
of the testator, shall live, and twenty-one years and
about nine months thereafter; and such persons can
easily be so selected, as with said additional years to
tie up the estate for a century."
It will be seen that this is similar to the English law before
the Act of 1800.
The Pennsylvania Act of 1853 is a clumsy copy of a
portion of the first section of the Thellusson Act.16 The
I4Supra. n. 12.
15Price. THE ACT
16Foulke, A

FOR THE SALE OF REAL ESTATE,

TREATISE ON

STRAINTS ON ALIENATION

THE RULES

AGAINST

p. 58 (1874).

PERPETUITIES,

AND RESTRAINTS ON ENJOYMENT

ABLE TO GIFTS OF PROPERTY IN PENNSYLVANIA,

As

RE-

APPLIC-

Paragraph 624 (1909).
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English Act provides four periods to which accumulation
may lawfully be made (numbers and italics supplied), to
wit:
"(1) for any longer term than the life or lives of any
such grantor or grantors, settler or settlers; (2) or the
term of twenty-one years from the death of any such
grantor, settler, devisor, or testator; (3) or during the
minority or respective minorities of any person or persons who shall be living, or in ventre sa mere at the
time of the death of such grantor, devisor, or testator;
(4) or during the minority or respective minorities only
of any such person or persons who, under the uses or
trusts of the deed . . . , would, for the time being, if of
full age, be entitled unto the .. , profits . .. so directed

to be accumulated."
Of the language of this English Act, Lord Chancellor
Brougham, is quoted on the title page of Hargraves book
as saying,

17

"An act, which has hardly ever been discussed,
in Courts either of Law or Equity, without the Judge
having occasion to observe upon the inartificial, and,
in several respects, ill defined language, in which its
provisions are expressed."
By comparing the two acts' s it will be observed that
the framers of the Pennsylvania Act made an almost literal
transcript of the first, second, and fourth clauses of the English Act, but carefully omitted the third clause. The relevant text (numbers and italics supplied) follows:
"(1) for any longer term than the life or lives of
any such grantor or grantors, settler or settlers, or
testator, (2) and the term of twenty-one years from
the death of any such grantor, settler, or testator, (4)
that is to say. only after such decease during the minority or respective minorities, with allowance for the
period of gestation, of any person or persons who,
under the uses or trusts of the deed . . . (etc.)."
1T Supra. note 6.

lIsSupra., notes 11 and 12.
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Four periods are created by the English Act but only
one of them can be taken. 19 In the Pennsylvania Act, instead of "(1), or (2), or (3), or (4)" as in the English Act,
we find merely by changes in explanatory words, "(1), and
(2), that is to say (4)." The result is that although the
wording is copied almost verbatim from the English Act, a
single period is prescribed as a limit for accumulations in
Pennsylvania. The three periods are amalgamated into
one.
The strict construction which has been placed on the
Pennsylvania Act by its courts has confined within narrow
limits the duration of trusts for accumulation, and has led
to unfavorable criticism of the Act, and of the decisions
under it.2 0 It is interesting to note, however, that the Commissioners who drafted the act did not intend the act to
allow accumulations to the extent to which they were al2
lowed by the Act from which they drew their wording. 1
The Commissioners reported as follows, after summing up
the then existing law (see supra):
"We have, therefore, added the ninth section to
the bill, being in substance the English Act of 39 & 40
Geo. III, c. 98, limiting the period of accumulation to
the minorities of such minors as may be interested, and
allowing them a living out of it, when without other
means of subsistence. In this latter respect the bill
goes beyond the English Act."
The leading Pennsylvania case under the Act is
Washington's Estate.22 The facts were: T bequeathed to
trustees, to accumulate surplus over a stipulated maintenance to T's infant daughter, said accumulations to be added
to the principal of T's estate upon the daughter's arriving
at 21. Guardian petitions for increased maintenance-held
for petitioner.
' 9 Authorities collected in Gray. THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES,

Paragraph 695, (2nd. Edit. 1906).
20Gray, Supra., note 19, Paragraph 717; Scott,
ULATIONS, Paragraph 155, p. 71.

(1888).

TRUSTS

2lSee Price, Supra., note 15 pps. 57, 58.
2275 Pa. 102 (1874), affirming 8 Phila. 182 (1871).

FOR AccuM-
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The actual holding of the case seems correct, i. e., that
where there is a direction to accumulate the income of a
minor, the guardian can have an adequate allowance decreed out of the income. The trouble with the case comes
from the reasoning of the Judges who wrote the opinions
in the Orphans' Court and in the Supreme Court.
The defense of the trustees was that the minor should
not be entitled to increased maintenance because the accumulations were for the benefit of the remaindermen, and
not for the minor.
Paxson, J., reasoned that the court could not grant increased allowance if the accumulations were to go to the
remaindermen without considering the Act, but that since
the Act provided that an adequate allowance could be
granted, it must follow that the accumulations must go to
23
the minor and not to the remaindermen
His error does not seem difficult to discover. If the
accumulations were to go to the minor, the court would not
need the aid of the proviso of the statute to grant an increased allowance. Hence the proviso of the statute
would be meaningless unless the legislature meant that the
accumulations during the minority not needed for support
of the minor could be capitalized for the benefit of the
estate or made the subject of other gift over.
In the Supreme Court, Gordon, J., bases his decision
on the theory that the direction to add the accumulations to
principal was void, and so the minor would have the right
to the accumulations upon attaining majority, as "the person,
or persons who would have been entitled thereto, if such
accumulation had not been directed." If this premise had
been correct, his conclusion allowing the increased allowance would have followed.
Gordon, J., says it is a contradiction in terms to allow
the income of a minor to be accumulated, and when he
comes of age to give the accumulations to someone else.
2
Concerning this, Foulke says:
38 Phila. at p. 187.
24Foulke, Supra., n. 16, page 386.
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"There was no contradiction in terms. The gift
took a portion of the income away from B and gave it
to A, and the court overlooked the fact that when the
statute permitted a direction to accumulate during that
period, it also permitted a disposition of that accumulation."
The result of the dicta in the Washington case is probably wrong. Considering the provisos of the English
Act, and the amalgamated proviso of the Pennsylvania Act,
it would seem that they were intended to mark out the respective times during which accumulations could lawfully
be made. Both statutes say "No person ... shall ... (accumulate) for any longer term than . . . " The Pennsyl-

vania Act goes further in allowing a reasonable support to
the minor out of these accumulations. But the Pennsylvania Courts relying on the decision in Washington's
Estate allow, in effect, only what would occur anyhow by
a gift to a minor, that
operation of law, that when there .is
which is not required for his support will be accumulated
until he becomes of age.
The Pennsylvania Act, it is true, allows accumulation
only during the minority of a person who would, for the
time being, if of full age, be entitled to the income so directed to be accumulated. The result of Washington's Estate
is that accumulation is restricted to one who would be entitled to the accumulations. The distinction is between the
words income and accumulations. Professor Gray gives the
25
following suppositious case:
"Income cannot be accumulated during the minority of A, unless A would be entitled to the income if of
full age. Suppose property is given in trust to pay
the income to A for life, and on A's death to transfer
the principal to B, and there is a direction to accumulate the income during A's minority, and to add the
accumulations to the principal. Such a direction
would certainly appear to be authorized by the
Statute. If A was of full age, he would be entitled
to the income; and that is enough, according to the
25Gray, THE
1915).

RULE

AGAINST

PERPETUITIES,

paragraph 717 (3rd Edit.
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Statute, to make the accumulation lawful. If A would
get the income if over age, accumulations made while
he is under age ought to be good, to whomsoever they
go, for there is nothing in the Statute requiring them
to go to A or any other person. Nevertheless, it has
been held that such a direction is void altogether, and
however little such a doctrine is justified by the
Statute, it is now well settled."
Scott, writing in 1888,26 seemed to think the decision
fully justified from the statute, saying:
"The construction placed upon the Act of 1853 in
Washington's Estate, and which has been followed by
many decisions to the same effect, is undoubtedly a
strict construction, confining within very narrow limits
the duration of all trusts for accumulation in Pennsylvania. Perhaps it is to be regretted that the language
of the Pennsylvania Statute is so sweeping in itsterms, for, says Paxton, J., in Washington's Estate, (8
Phila. 189) 'it is difficult to see the wisdom of any Act
which requires in a large estate, the accumulated income of a minor to be paid to him upon his arrival at
full age. There are many instances where such a
thing would be injurious to him in the highest degree.
The capitalization of the income and the payment to
him of only the interest after majority, would often
promote his best good. There would seem to be no
reason of public policy demanding such a change in
the right of disposing of property. And I desire to
call the attention of the profession to the fact that our
Act does not, as the Thellusson does, allow accumulation for the purpose of the payment of debts or to provide for raising portions for children.' It would seem
also, that, in such cases, the same policy of the law
which favors accumulation during minority, should
have repelled the idea of the compulsory subjection of
such accumulations to the free control of the minor
when just of age."
The above quotations indicate one very unfortunate
result of the Pennsylvania law, whether such is due to the
Act or the decision of the court.
Carson's Appeal 27 came before the Supreme Court in
26Supra., note 20, page 21, paragraph 155..
2799

Pa. 325 (1882).

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

1882. There, the settlors, by trust deed attempted to
capitalize the accumulations during an existing minority, the
income on the accumulations to be paid to the minor after
attaining majority. In a short opinion, based largely on
the decision of Washington's Estate, it was held that the
attempt to capitalize accumulations for the period of an existing minority was illegal. The finality of the decision of
the Court on the attempted capitalization of accumulations
is seen from the following quotation from the opinion by
Trunkey, J. :_21
"time enough has elapsed for legislative correction, if the intendment of the statute has been misapprehended by the courts. The ingenious argument
for the appellants (that the thing prohibited by the
Act is the accumulating of income beyond a certain
term, not the donor's free disposition of the income
accumulated within a permitted term) is convincing
that much may be said favorable as to the opposite
construction, and that the intendment is not so clear as
to preclude doubt; but we are not convinced that the
repeated and uniform decisions upon the very question now presented should be overruled. Stare decisis.
Decree affirmed and appeal dismissed at the costs of
appellants."
The rule which we have been discussing so far as the
result of the unnecessary decision of Washington's Estate,
and confirmed by Carson's Appeal may be stated thus:
A direction to accumulate is void, though it be only for
the minority of a person in being, if the accumulations are
not to go to the minor upon his attaining majority.
Subsequent cases have evinced no intention to qualify the
rule, and the offer to the legislature to correct that interpretation of the statute, if erroneous, has remained unaccepted.
The later cases state this rule with a citation to Washington's Estate as they would state a fundamental axiom. Discussion of the later authorities for this proposition would be
of no advantage as the Pennsylvania courts always go back
to Washington's Estate as the original authority, and such
2899

Pa. at p. 329.
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citation of authority would have the disadvantage of adding
to the confusion of the erroneous holding on the disposition
of accumulations unlawfully directed. Most of the late
cases come before the court with the illegality of the accumulations unquestioned, the sole point for consideration
being the disposition of such accumulations as have accrued.
We will therefore turn to the line of cases qualifying
and modifying Washington's Estate on the problem of disposition of income directed to be accumulated for other
than the benefit of the minor.
III

In Stille's Appeal,29 there was a direction to accumulate the income of a portion of the residue of the estate
until a granddaughter reached twenty-one, then to pay the
income of the whole sum to the granddaughter for life. It
was held in the court below and affirmed by the Supreme
Court that the direction to accumulate was void as not being a direction to accumulate the income of a minor, but
decided on the authority of Washington's Estate as follows: 0
"if a will directed unlawful accumulations to be
made during the minority of an infant to be capitalized,
and the interest of the capitalized accumulations to be
paid to the person, formerly an infant, during life,
from and after the attainment of majority, the unlawful
accumulations are the property of the minor."
The general proposition derived from the cases of
Washington's Estate and Stille's Appeal, is that the minor
gets the accumulations upon arriving at majority, although
the testator in the will provided that the minor should get
only the income from the accumulations: in short, that
where the accumulations for the period of an existing
minority are to be capitalized, the minor takes merely because his minority marked out the period for the accumulation to take place.
294

804

W. N. C. 42, (1877).
W. N. C. at p. 43.
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In White's Estate,"-an estate which has created several cases in the reports on the Act of 1853, the facts being
slightly different from Washington's Estate and Stille's Appeal, a conclusion was reached that illegally accumulated
income fell into the residuary estate of the testator.
The testator provided a trust fund for A for life, a
baby at the testator's death, but until A reached twentyfive only so much of the income to be paid him as the executors thought proper. At A's death the accumulations
and the principal were to go to A's issue.
It was held that the accumulation impliedly directed
was inoperative, as for a period longer than a minority, and
for the ultimate benefit of other than the minor. But the
accumulations resulting from income not expended on the
minor during minority were distributed under the residuary
clause of the will, and did not go to the minor as contended.
The following quotation from the opinion of Penrose,
J., later became very important in the law of distribution of
illegally accumulated incomes.2
"Accumulation is forbidden by the act no less
where it results by indirection than where it is expressly ordered; the striking down of the illegal accumulation leaves the will as if it had been silent on
the subject, and future gifts are not accelerated; if the
accumulation relates to a vested interest taking effect
in possession, the released income goes at once to the
beneficiary-if to an interest not vested in possession,
the income goes to the residuary legatee or devisee.
unless the residuary estate itself be the subject of the
provisions, in which case the income goes under the
intestate laws to the next of kin or heirs: 1 Jarman
on Wills, 274; Mitcheson's Estate, 11 W. N. C. 547;
Gray on Perp., secs. 671, et seq."
33
The year following the decision of White's Estate.
the Supreme Court handed down the decision in Farnum's
Estate.3 4 A fund was given to trustees to accumulate twothirds of the income until a minor daughter attained twenty318 Dist. 33, (1898).

Dist. at p. 35.
S8Supra. n. 31.
828

"191 Pa. 75 (1899).
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one, then to "set over out of her share, the sum of $20,000."
As against the trustee's contention that the $20,000 should
be paid out of the accumulations, the daughter was given
the $20,000 out of principal, as well as the accumulations,
35
under the rule of Washington's Estate.

In 1909 Weinrnann's Estatez6 the will created a fund to
accumulate until the grandson reached forty, then to capitalize whole fund, and pay income to grandson for life, then
over to his children or into residue of estate. Held, that
the illegally accumulated income went to the residuary
legatee of the testator and not to the grandson. Here the
fact that the grandson was entitled to nothing until he
reached forty, made it easy to distinguish the case from
Washington's Estate, and hold rather that it fell into the
category of White's Estate. The logic of the court seems
to be this: since the grandson could not have taken the
accumulations if the direction had been legal, it cannot be
that under an illegal direction he should have a higher
right. Lamorelle, J., in the opinion of the Orphans' Court
remarked that this case was not to be confused with the
line of cases commencing with Washington's Estate, where
the trust began in an actual minority and the accumulations
have been given to the minor when he becomes of age, regardless of the provision of the will that he is not to take
them. "Whether the cases above cited are sound or not
they embody the law; but there is no reason why their
doctrine should be extended."37 The case is not to be distinguished from White's Estate.83 Since by the will the
grandson is under no circumstances given the accumulations, he cannot be such a person as the Act speaks of as
"otherwise entitled." Had the grandson been given the
accumulations upon arriving at forty, he would have been
such a person.
In 1909 then, the situation was this: there were two
35Compare Stocking's Estate, Infra. n.62.
36223 Pa. 508 (1909).
37223 Pa. at p.510.
SeSupra. n.31.
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lines of authority each fortified with subsequent cases, and
doubt had been cast upon the merit of the line of cases beginning with Washington's Estate by the remark of the
lower court judge in Weinmann's Estate, although he assumed that the law had become settled for better or for
worse. In all of the four cases discussed, the will had provided for other disposition of the accumulations than giving
it to the minor, the only difference between the cases seeming to be that when the accumulation was for a period of
an existing minority, and the accumulations were to go elsewhere than to the minor, the minor took regardless of the
will, whereas if the accumulations were void as an attempt
to accumulate for a longer period than an existing minority,
then the accumulations would not go to the minor but would
be disposed of as though the provision for accumulation had
not been made.
In 1910 Wright's Estate39 came before the court. The
facts were: A fund was bequeathed to trustees to invest
and reinvest income until grandaughter X reached
twenty-one, then to pay the income from the corpus and the
accumulations as an entire fund to X until her youngest
daughter reached twenty-one, then to be divided among the
living children of X. Appeal by F, father of X as residuary
legatee of T, on the theory that the accumulations were as
undisposed property under the will. Held, for F.
The accumulations were void under the statute because
an accumulation for other than the minor, although the
period through which the accumulations were to be made
was an existing minority. This was the same fact which
made illegal the accumulations in Stille's Appeal/o and
Farnum's Estate.41 That the accumulations were unlawful
was admitted by both sides, showing the closed situation
which exists as to that particular holding of Washington's
Estate.42 The auditing judge held that the accumulations
39227 Pa, 69 (1910).
4OSupra. n. 29.
1lSupra. n. 34.
42 Supra. n. 22.
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should go to the minor. In the opinion of the lower court4
the case could not be distinguished from Stille's Appeal,
and the decision of the auditor was affirmed. The Supreme
Court said:

4

4

Potter. J... "This has made it necessary for us to
examine carefully the decision on Stille's Appeal, to
ascertain whether the grounds upon which it was based
are tenable, and we are satisfied that they are not ...
As the decision in Stille's Appeal was thus based
upon a misapprehension of one of the points decided
in Washington's Estate, it cannot be regarded as
authority upon the particular point in question. The
same may be said of Farnum's Est., 191 Pa. 75, in
which by similar inadvertence, in supposed conformity with Washington's Estate, it was announced
that accumulations unlawfully made during a minority,
are to go to the minor, absolutely upon arriving at
maturity...
"We think the present case is not to be distinguished in principle from Weinmann's Estate, 223 Pa.
508... "

Thus finally in 1910 the cases on distribution of illegally accumulated income were brought into harmony by
adopting the rules laid down by Penrose, J., in White's
Estate.41 The unfortunate and seemingly unnecessarily restricted interpretation by the Supreme Court in Washington's Estate continues, criticized but unquestioned, to limit
accumulations under the Pennsylvania statute to those of
the estate of a minor, during his minority, with power in the
proper court to grant an adequate allowance out of those
accumulations for his support. Such an accumulation, it
43Supra. n. 29.

44227 Pa. at p. 73.
45Supra. n. 31 (8 Dist.) at p. 35. See also Kerr's Estate 13 D.
C. 557, (1930), where a will created a trust for payments in specified
amounts to certain beneficiaries for life, with a vested gift over to remaindermen. Held that the income in excess of the specified amounts
was a void accumulation which would pass to the next of kin under the
intestate laws and not to the remaindermen, because the latter having

no right to present possession could not be persons "who would have
been entitled thereto, if such accumulation had not been directed." See
also Ludescher's Estate 14 D. & C. 645 (1930).
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would seem, would be permissible by operation of law, even
in the face of a statute which would make a blanket prohibition of all accumulations, with no exception provisos.
Since 1910 the Supreme Court has consistently followed the state of authority as it then stood, but there is
one recent development of considerable importance.
Nirdlinger's Estate,4

shows

that Pennsylvania has

firmly decided to follow the apportionment doctrine in the
distribution of extraordinary corporate dividends. In that
case, the Court in a twenty-page opinion gives a very comprehensive digest of the cases under the Massachusetts, the
Kentucky and the Pennsylvania or American rules. It
seems to be the doctrine of the Pennsylvania cases that the
remainderman is entitled to just what the stock was actually worth at the time of the creation of the trust, no less
and no more. To this end the stock dividend is divided
in order to place in the capital account a sufficient amount
to maintain the intact value of the stock.
In Boyer's Appeal, 7 Mr. Justice Potter says:
"And then after all, the rule for the determination
of controversies over dividends, between life tenants
and remaindermen, should be to give to each just what
the donor intended each to have. As has been said,
the intent of the grantor or testator is the pole star for
the guidance of the Courts."
The importance of a consideration of the distribution
of such extraordinary corporate dividends in the drafting
of any trust instrument is obvious. By placing these extraordinary dividends to the income account, the estate of the
remaindermen may be seriously impaired, while by throwing them to the capital account, the estate of the immediate
income beneficiary may likewise be impaired. If allowed,
the lirection of a testator to direct that stock dividends be
placed in the capital account might result in an accumulation. The general opinion of the Bar after the statement of
the Court in Boyer's Appeal", that the donor's opinion
66290 Pa. 457 (1927)..
47224 Pa. 144, 153, (1909).
,SSupra. n. 42.
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would be followed, was that in a trust a provision to place
all stock dividends in the capital account would be upheld.
For this reason it was customary to make such a provision
in wills and deeds of trust to protect the remaindermen
against the effects of the apportionment doctrine, and to
render the administration less complicated on the part of the
trustee.
In 1928 some doubt was cast upon the validity of such
a provision. In Jones v. Integrity Trust Company,"9 dealing with the apportionment of a certain stock dividend, but
not involving the Act of 1853, Mr. Justice Simpson, in the
final paragraph of his opinion, says: 5 '
"Our attention has been called to the fact that in
some quarters it is supposed that our prior decisions
on the subject would be applicable in cases of extraordinary stock dividends and rights to subscribe, even
though the testator or settlor who created the trust,
had provided a different method of distribution under
such circumstances. This is incorrect; what the will
or deed specifies must be carried into effect, so far as
it is legal." (Italics supplied).
Thereupon, members of the bar who had drafted trusts
with the aforementioned provisions became apprehensive,
lest the above qualification of Mr. Justice Simpson was
directed toward bringing such a provision within the Act
of 1853.
This doubt was soon settled. In Maris' Estate,5 1 a
husband by will created a trust to pay the net income to his
widow for life and made the provision that "all stock dividends consisting of shares of stock of the corporations issuing them shall be considered as principal." The court below held that this latter provision was in effect a direction
to accumulate contrary to the provisions of the Act of 1853.
and its conclusion was affirmed by the Supreme Court, Mr.
Chief Justice Moschzisker writing the opinion.
"0292 Pa. 149 (1928).
50292 Pa. at p. 156.
51301 Pa. 21 (1930).
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The decision in Maris' case seems to be in line with
the previous decisions of the Pennsylvania courts on the
Act of 1853 and with their view of the distribution of extraordinary corporate dividends. Although it may be a disappointment to some testators who have prepared wills to
obtain the greatest advantage of the Act of 1853, it is well
that the law has become settled on this point.
A distinction must be made between an accumulation
which is void under the statute and a gift which is void as
a violation of the rule against perpetuities, because of remoteness in vesting. In the case of an accumulation, the
trust is void only as to the excess of accumulations not allowed by the Act of 1853 and the balance of the gift is enforced under the terms of the will; whereas in a gift void
for remoteness under the rule against perpetuities, the entire gift fails. In such a case, of course, the entire accumulations fail with the gift itself. An example of this is Lilley's
Estate,5" where a rich coal operator attempted to leave his
residuary estate, amounting to almost his entire holdings,
in trust, to be managed and accumulated for a period of
ninety-nine years as a term in gross, then to be divided
among the then living heirs of. two named persons. The
Court found that the testator died intestate as to his resi-

duary property, and the vast estate passed under the Intestate Laws.
In the case of Brown v. Williamson's Executors,"
Justice Strong said"The trust indeed may be transgressive, but even
under the Ripon Act, 39 & 40 Geo. III, ch. 98, in England the excess only beyond the period allowed for
trusts of accumulation is void. They are sustained
for the statutory period. Our Act of 1853 was
modelled after the Ripon Act and it avoids only the
excess in transgressive trusts."
In doubtful cases, therefore, a lawyer, so long as he
keeps his original gift within the requirements of the rule
52272 Pa. 143 (1922).
5316 Pa.338, 341 (1860),
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against perpetuities, can assure a client insisting upon an
accumulation of doubtful legality that the gift will not fail
entirely and that the worst that can happen to the client's
wishes will be that the excess accumulations will be distributed and not capitalized.
It is to be remembered that this act has been held by
the Pennsylvania courts to have no extra-territorial operation. In Fowler's Appeal,5" the will in question had been
executed in Illinois, where the grantor lived, and the beneficiary was a citizen of Colorado. The trustee, however,
was a Pennsylvania corporation. It was held that the mere
fact of the trustee being a Pennsylvania corporation would
not invalidate a trust valid by the law of the state where
created and by the law of the state where it was to be enjoyed. Mr. Chief Justice Paxson said:51
"The Act of 1853 was only intended to apply to
our own citizens and a trust intended to take effect
beyond our own territory cannot be affected by it."
Similarly, a trust for accumulation valid in the state of
original administration is valid as to ancillary administration in Pennsylvania, though void under the act. In De
Renne's Estate,6 a testator who had died domiciled i n
Georgia created a trust for accumulation valid there but
invalid under Pennsylvania law. It was held that the fund
should be remitted to the domicile of the testator for distribution.
It has been held that a reasonable contingent fund
which the trustee might require in the administration of the
trust is not an accumulation within the prohibition of the
statute.5 7 In Eberly's Appeal,5 8 the testator devised upon
an active trust to maintain certain realty, and to pay to a
54125 Pa. 388 (1899).
55Supra. n. 54, (125 Pa.) at p. 393.
5612 W. N. C. 94 (1882).
57Howeli's Estate, 180 Pa. 515, (1897). But an intent to add such
income to a fund of permanent nature is invalid, McKee's Appeal, 96 Pa.
277, (1880). See also Sinnot's Estate, 310 Pa. 463 ,(1933).
58110 Pa. 95 (1885).
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son an annuity. Upon the son's reaching majority, the trustee was to pay him $500.00 annually until the son reached
twenty-five, when the corpus was to be paid to him if the
trustee thought fit. At the son's majority, the trustee had
accumulated income to the extent of about $5,000.00, which
amount was held to be a reasonable contingent fund and
not an accumulation payable to the son. Eberly's Appeal
shows the investigation by the courts into the meaning with
which the word "accumulation" was used in the statute.
Perhaps the best authority upon the meaning of the word
"accumulation" as used occurs in Wahl's Estate5 9 There
a devise of $500.00 was to be paid out of rents as soon as
there was a sufficient accumulation for that purpose. Held:
this was not a direction to accumulate within the provisions
of the act, Judge Penrose of the Orphans' Court saying:60
"In all cases, however, the first inquiry is, how far,
if at all, has the will under consideration directed, or
indirectly occasioned an accumulation contrary to the
statute. The term itself implies a withholding of income for the purpose of creating an increased and constantly increasing fund for distribution at a future time;
and, manifestly, a present beneficial gift of income
until a certain sum shall have been received by the
donee, is not in itself forbidden by anything in either
the letter or spirit of the Act. A direction to apply
rents or income in payment of a specified sum to a
designated person is no more a direction to accumulate
than a gift of the estate, until out of the rents the donee
has received an equivalent amount, would be. Such
a direction gives to the legatee a vested interest in
the rents, etc., as they arise; and if there be coupled
with it a provision for accumulation until the trustee
shall have enough to pay in full, the only person having the right to complain is the legatee himself-the
person who in the language of the Act, 'would have
been entitled

. .

, if such accumulation had not been

directed'."
Rogers' Estate, 1 gives Supreme Court authority to the
5026 W. N. C. 249 (1890).
60Supra. n. 59, (26 W. N. C.) at p. 250.
61179 Pa. 602, (1897).
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foregoing quotation from Judge Penrose. In that case, reported with a somewhat misleading syllabus, the daughter
of the testator sought to set aside a provision for accumulation for the benefit of the granddaughters of the testator.
The testator had provided for an accumulation until the
sum of $10,000.00 was obtained, which sum was then to be
used in the construction of a four-story brick business
house. From the terms of the will, the accumulation might
have been invalid, but as the beneficiaries were minors and
it was agreed that the desired accumulation would be attained before the eldest granddaughter attained her majority, the holding of the Court really amounts to no more
than that an appellant, without interest, cannot set up the
invalidity of a direction to accumulate.
In Stocking's Estate,62 the testator directed an accumulation until his grandson reached twenty-three, at which
time he was to be paid the sum of $7,000.00, Upon arriving at twenty-one, the grandson demanded and obtained
the accumulations to that date. In the case cited, he attempted to obtain $7,000.00 out of the principal of the
estate. It was held that the testator's intention was that
the $7,000.00 should be paid out of accumulated income and
that as the grandson had already obtained the accumulations up to the time of his majority, the sum so received by
him was a credit against the legacy, and that he could not
now enforce his claim for the full amount of the gift. The
opinion, written by Mr. Justice Kephart, contains the following expression as to the importance of carrying out the tes63

tator's intention:

"The specific object of the statute is otherwise to
maintain testator's intention: if that intention is in part
frustrated by the act, it will only be to the extent
necessary to carry out the act's mandate. Otherwise
that intention will be effectuated, as in the distribution
here made. The act against accumulations was not
intended to punish the testator or penalize his estate
because his will ran counter to that law. The effect
62304

Pa. 476, (1931).

63Supra. n. 62, (304 Pa.) at p. 480.
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of our decision is that, though the accumulation beyond the grandson's majority was unlawful and he
was entitled to take the accumulated income immediately on his reaching twenty-one, and the income
yearly thereafter, he cannot carve out of the principal
of the trust estate what the testator intended to be
made up of income."
Flinn's Estate,6' indicates that the Supreme Court as at
present constituted will not allow any expansion within the
field of permissible accumulations. There a will permitted
the executors five years in which to complete the administration of the estate. The question before the court was
at what time the intact value of certain testamentary trusts
should be calculated. The court after citing the general
rule of Waterhouse's Estate 65 that the intact value must be
determined as of the date of death, through Mr. Justice Kephart, said:
"To hold that the trust was not effective at death,
or was suspended or held in abeyance until the estate
was settled, permits the income from these stocks to
accumulate in violation of the Act of April 18, 1853,
P. L. 503, condemning such accumulations of income."

IV
The limits to which accumulations may be directed by
will have occupied almost entirely the preceding discussion.
It will be remembered that the Act applies to accumulations
directed either by will or by deed, and also applies to accumulations whether directed for the life of the grantor or
during an existing minority. The authorities seem absolutely bare of any helpful material upon accumulations
directed by deed for the life of the grantor. There is one
case, however, of an accumulation directed by deed for an
existing minority.. This is Carson's Appeal, 6 where there
was a direction by deed to accumulate for an existing
minority, accumulations to be capitalized when the minor
04310

Pa. 206 (1932).

65308 Pa. 422 (1932).
66
Supra. n. 27.
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attained majority, and the income to be paid thereafter to
the former minor. The opinion follows Washington's
Estate67 and gives no help whatever to an understanding of
the extent to which an accumulation by deed for the period
of the life of the grantor would be held valid. From this
case, it seems clear, however, that the authorities as to
trusts for accumulation created by will would be followed in
cases where accumulations are directed by deed. In Carson's Appeal, the appellants, after the decision awarding the
accumulations absolutely to the minor, presented a petition
for a modification of the decree as to the portion of the fund
derived from the accumulations of income prior to the death
of the grantor. Their motion for rehearing was refused,
Mr. Justice Trunkey saying:"'
"This deed contains no direction for accumulation during the grantor's life. It vests the property in
the trustees, for use of certain persons, with directions
for accumulation during their minority. After its delivery the grantor had no interest in, or power to control, the estate. The Act of 1853 applies to an estate
held under a deed, just as it would if held upon the
same terms under the will. In either case directions
for accumulation are void so far as in conflict with the
statute, and it can make no difference whether such
accumulations, when the property passed by deed,
accrued within the lifetime of the grantor, or after his
decease. The authorities cited by the appellants relate to cases where the trusts were created by will.
and show no distinction between them and like trusts
created by deed, as respects the question presented in
the prayer for a modification of the decree."
This opinion would seem to leave as an open question
the power of a grantor to direct by an inter vivos trust
deed a direction to accumulate until the death of the grantor. It would seem from the phraseology of the Act that
such an accumulation would be valid, even though the beneficiary attained his majority before the death of the grantor.
sTSupra. n. 22.
6SSupra. n. 27, (99 Pa.) at p. 330.
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It seems surprising that there is no case on this point,
but one explanation may be that if such deeds of trust are
made, the minor, upon attaining his majority in the lifetime
of the grantor, would hesitate to litigate his right to attain
the accumulations, in the fear that should he do so, he might
be less fortunate when the will of the grantor was probated.
It would seem, then, that there is grave doubt as to
whether the courts would permit the accumulation of income, under a trust created by deed, during the life of the
grantor; and it is possible that they would follow the analogy of the will cases and hold that the only accumulation
of income permitted under deeds of trust is the income of a
minor beneficiary during his or her minority, without regard to the fact that the grantor may still be living; and of
course, such accumulation would be subject to the control
of the court, under the terms of the Act, as to allowances
for the support of the minor. On the other hand, it may be
that when the question arises, the courts will follow the
language of the Act, and permit the accumulation of income
during the lifetime of the grantor, even though the beneficiary be of full age. It is submitted that such a holding
would be correct; accumulations are invalid, not because of
any rule of public policy, but merely because of statutory
prohibition; and the Act of 1853 does not seem to prohibit
accumulations during the life of the grantor.

APPENDIX A
The Act of 39 & 40 Geo. III c. 98, 1800, reads as follows:
AN ACT
To restrain all Trusts and Directions in Deeds or Wills,
whereby the Profits or Produce of real or personal
Estate shall be accumulated, and the beneficial Enjoyment thereof postponed, beyond the Time therein
limited.
(28th July, 1800)
Whereas it is expedient that all dispositions of real or
personal estates, whereby the profits and produce thereof
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are directed to be accumulated, and the beneficial enjoyment thereof is postponed, should be made subject to the
May it please your
restrictions hereinafter contained:
Majesty, that it may be enacted, and be it enacted by the
King's most excellent Majesty, by and with the advice and
consent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal and Commons,
in parliament assembled, and by the authority of the same,
that no person or persons shall, after the passing of this act,
by any deed or deeds, surrender or surrenders, will, codicil
or otherwise howsoever, settle or dispose of any real or
personal property, so and in such manner that the rents,
issues, profits or produce thereof shall be wholly or partially
accumulated; for any longer term than the life or lives of
any such grantor or grantors, settler or settlers; or the term
of twenty-one years from the death of any such grantor,
settler, devisor or testator; or during the minority or respective minorities of any person or persons who shall be living,
or in ventre sa mere at the time of the death of such grantor,
devisor, or testator; or during the minority or respective
minorities only of any person or persons who, under the
uses or trusts of the deed, surrender, will or other assurances directing such accumulations, would, for the time being, if of full age, be entitled unto the rents, issues and
profits or the interest, dividends or annual produce so directed to be accumulated; and in every case where any accumulation shall be directed otherwise than as aforesaid, such
direction shall be null and void; and the rents, issues, profits
and produce of such property so directed to be accumulated,
shall, so long as the same shall be directed to be accumulated contrary to the provisions of this Act, go to and be received by such person or persons as would have been entitled thereto if such accumulation had not been directed.
II. Provided always, and be it enacted, That nothing
in this Act contained shall extend to any provision for payment of debts of any grantor, settler or devisor, or other
person or persons, or to any provision for raising portions
for any child or children of any grantor, settler or devisor,
or any child or children of any person taking any interest
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under any such conveyance, settlement or devise, or to any
direction touching the produce of timber or wood upon any
lands or tenements; but that all such provisions and directions shall and may be made and given as if this Act had
not passed.
III. Provided also, and be it enacted, That nothing in
this Act contained shall extend to any disposition respecting heritable property within that part of Great Britain
called Scotland.
IV. Provided also, and be it enacted, That the restrictions in this Act contained shall take effect and be in
force with respect to wills and testaments made and executed before the passing of this Act, in such cases only
where the devisor or testator shall be living, and of sound
and disposing mind, after the expiration of twelve calendar
months from the passing of this Act.
APPENDIX B
The Act of April 18, 1853, P. L. 503, section 9, as
amended by the Act of April 14, 1931, P. L. 29, reads as follows:
"Section 9. That no person or persons shall,
after the passing of this dct, by any deed, will, or
otherwise, settle or dispose of any real or personal
property, so and in such manner that the rents, issues,
interest, or profits thereof, shall be wholly or partially
accumulated for any longer term than the life or lives
of any such grantor or grantors, settler or settlers, or
testator, and the term of twenty-one years from the
death of any such grantor, settler, or testator, that is
to say, only after such decease during the minority or
respective minorities with allowance for the period of
gestation of any person or persons, who, under the
uses or trusts of the deed, will, or other assurance
directing such accumulation, would, for the time being,
if of full age, be entitled unto the rents, issues, interests, and profits so directed to accumulate, and in every
case where any accumulation shall be directed otherwise than as aforesaid, such direction shall be null and
void in so far as it shall exceed the limits of this act,
and the rents, issues, interests, and profits, so directed,
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to be accumulated contrary to the provisions of this
act, shall go to and be received by such person or persons as would have been entitled thereto if such accumulation had not been directed: Provided, That
any donation, bequest, or devise, for any literary.
scientific, charitable, or religious purpose, shall not
come within the prohibition of this section, which shall
take effect and be in force, as well in respect to wills
heretofore made by persons yet living and of competent mind, as in respect to wills hereafter to be made :
And provided, That notwithstanding any direction to
accumulate rents, issues, interests, and profits, for the
benefit of any minor or minors, it shall be lawful for
the proper court as aforesaid, on the application of
the guardian, where there shall be no other means for
maintenance or education, to decree an adequate allowance for such purpose, but in such manner as to
make an equal distribution among those having equal
rights or expectations, whether at the time being
minors or of lawful age."
GEORGE HAY KAIN, Jr.
York, Pa.

